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Introduction
Israel has traditionally been one of the most important allies of the United 
States in the Middle East. However, since 2013, Israel has been building 
a new partnership with China in the areas of trade, tourism, technology, 
infrastructure, and security. A recent report by the Rand Corporation1 
took into account this new strategic reality. The Israelis appear to be 
motivated by the changes in the country’s strategic environment, its 
crisis in the relationship with the United States during the Obama years, 
and its economic and infrastructural needs. Nevertheless, Israel is still 
deeply anchored in the alliance with the United States, which will impose 
limitations on how far its partnership with China can grow. However, 
despite the fact that Israel will not replace the US with China as its main 
great power partner, this partnership attests to the new geopolitical 
reality in which even the most ardent US allies, like Israel, are hedging 
their bets and diversifying their partnerships by engaging China. This type 
of reaction to China’s rise is particularly attractive as the Sino-American 
rivalry is becoming the dominant theme of the international system. 
Israel Embraces the Dragon
The cornerstone of this partnership has been the Israeli Prime Minister 
Benjamin Netanyahu’s May 20132 state visit to China, during which he 
met the Chinese President Xi Jinping. On that occasion, Netanyahu 
told Xi of Israel’s respect for China’s success and spoke of his desire to 
promote partnerships with China. “We view China with great admiration 
and we know that it is led by forward-looking leaders with great vision, 
great clarity and great openness,” Netanyahu said at the time.
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The partnership 
with China 
has also been 
motivated by 
the change in 
Israel’s regional 
and strategic 
environment. 
Namely, Israel 
has significantly 
altered its 
national security 
doctrine in order 
to adapt to its 
turbulent strategic 
environment 
in the past 
seven years.
Troublesome Neighbourhood 
The partnership with China has also been motivated 
by the change in Israel’s regional and strategic 
environment. Namely, Israel has significantly altered 
its national security doctrine3 in order to adapt to its 
turbulent strategic environment in the past seven 
years. Historically, the Israeli foreign and security 
policy was based on what was referred to as the “the 
periphery doctrine,”4 or the alliance of the periphery. 
“The periphery doctrine” was developed by David 
Ben-Gurion, one of Israel’s founders and the country’s 
first Prime Minister. This foreign policy strategy and 
the doctrine that underpinned it were grounded in the 
notion that Israel is encircled by hostile Arab states 
that are supportive of Palestinians. Therefore, to 
generate new diplomatic and strategic options for 
itself and to overcome its Arab encirclement, Israel 
needed to form alliances with non-Arab states in its 
periphery, such as the Shah’s Iran and Kemalist Turkey. 
It was in 2011 that a major change took place. At 
that point, Israel’s rivalry with Iran, its allies, and 
its proxies—namely the Assad regime in Syria and 
Hezbollah in Lebanon—had already been going on for 
two decades. The new strategic reality which kicked 
in for Israel was that relations with Erdogan’s Turkey 
was deteriorating just as much of the Middle East 
and North Africa found itself in turmoil after the Arab 
Spring. These trends forced Israel to revise its periphery 
doctrine so as to encompass a greater geographic area 
in order to form new alliances and partnerships with 
countries in Southeastern Europe, including Greece 
and Cyprus as well as Italy, Azerbaijan, South Sudan, 
and India. This was done both to compensate for the 
lack of reliable partner in Arab and non-Arab Muslim 
periphery and to create new opportunities for Israel in 
commercial, diplomatic and security terms as these 
countries all fear in one form or the other the turmoil 
in the Islamic world. Therefore, partnering with a 
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rising global power such as China was a 
logical choice for Israel as Israel wanted 
to expand its global partnerships in order 
to compensate for its unpredictable 
neighbourhood in the Middle East, North 
Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean.
Obama Years Leave  
the Bitter Taste
More importantly, the issues that emerged 
in Israel’s relationship with the United 
States during the Obama years have 
played an even bigger role in the country’s 
decision to get close to China. This is 
when the United States tried to re-orient 
its military capabilities and interest toward 
the Asia-Pacific in order to address the 
challenge of China’s rise, embarking on 
a policy known as the “pivot” to Asia5. 
The policy implied that the United States 
would be paying less attention to other 
regions, including the Middle East, thus 
limiting Israel’s ability to rely on the 
alliance with the US as the pillar of Israel’s 
foreign and security policy. Israel was 
also displeased with the nuclear deal6 
that the Obama administration brokered 
with Iran, as it mistrusted Iran.  Israel 
also feared that the nuclear deal would 
lead to the opening of Iran to the United 
States7 in the long run, which would in turn 
mean that Israel would lose its privileged 
status as a major U.S. ally in the region. 
Finally, Israel was concerned with the 
appointment of John Kerry to be the U.S. 
Secretary of State during Obama’s second 
term. Allegedly bent on creating his own 
political legacy, Kerry set out to resolve the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict8 and reinitiate 
the peace negotiations. Kerry’s mission 
ultimately failed but it nevertheless irked 
the Israeli government and acted as one 
of the motives for Israel to seek out new 
partners. For Israel, China is a suitable 
partner due to its political neutrality, as it 
does not interfere in governance issues, 
human rights or political disputes that 
do not infringe on its core interests. This 
particularly came to the fore in regards to 
the Palestine issue. As one of Netanyahu’s 
associates told Gideon Rachman,9 the 
foreign affairs commentator of the 
Financial Times: “We spent seven hours 
with the Chinese leadership. You know 
how long they spent on the Palestinians? 
Roughly twenty seconds.” The partnership 
with China gives Israel flexibility that it 
lacks in its partnership with the US, as 
the Chinese reputation in the Middle East 
is not tainted with the Palestinian issue. 
This is in stark contrast to the way the US 
is perceived by Muslim populations as 
being an unconditional champion for the 
Israelis at the expense of the Palestinians.
Sino-Israel Partnership 
Pays Off 
Trade10 between China and Israel is 
flourishing. In 2018, the total trade 
between the two was estimated at close 
to USD 14 billion as opposed to 2014 
when it was USD 10.9 billion. For the 
sake of comparison, in 1992, this number 
amounted to USD 50 million, showing that 
the improved political dialogue between 
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the two has been followed by growing 
trade ties as well. In the meantime, there 
are talks of a new free trade agreement11 
between the two countries which have 
been ongoing since 2016. China has been 
a major source of revenue12 for the Israeli 
tourism sector. Even though in 2018 
there has been a drop in the number of 
Chinese tourists over the security concerns 
caused by Trump’s decision to move the 
US Embassy to Jerusalem, the number of 
Chinese tourists in the first half of 2019 
jumped by 67% compared to the same 
period in 2018. As the Washington-based 
Middle East Institute13 stated: “Outbound 
tourism has emerged as an instrument of 
China’s soft-power strategy in the Middle 
East. The number of Chinese workers, 
tourists, students, and businessmen 
overseas are increasing, and interaction 
with local populations plays a considerable 
role in shaping China’s image to the outside 
world and promoting understanding 
among its counterparts in the region.”
Israel has in turn been a particularly 
attractive partner in the domain of 
technology14 investments for both the 
Chinese state and Chinese conglomerates 
such as Alibaba. China is trying to learn 
from Israel’s economic model,15 which is 
based on technology and innovation, as the 
country wants to move away from its own 
model that is based on manufacturing. For 
advanced countries like the US, Canada 
and the EU member states, this would 
mean increased global competition from 
China for the technology market share, 
and it also means that China is trying 
to develop its own internal market as 
opposed to being overly dependent on 
international markets. The Israeli hi-tech 
company IRP Systems,16 specializing 
in aviation-related technology, wants to 
supply China with its products, particularly 
the aviation propulsion systems.
In the domain of infrastructure,17 Israel is 
considering the possibility of joining the 
Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), as 
the Israeli population is predicted to double 
in size in the next thirty years, thereby 
generating a need for a USD 200 billion 
increase in its infrastructural capacities. 
This creates an opportunity for China to 
use its capital, technology, and manpower 
through state-owned enterprises in order 
to implement these projects in Israel. In 
Haifa and Ashdod,18 the Chinese company 
China Harbor Engineering is constructing 
two billion dollars’ worth of seaports in 
the proximity of the U.S. Sixth Fleet in 
the Mediterranean, causing concern19 
in the United States over the possibility 
of espionage and strategic maritime 
infrastructure control. Moreover, Ashdod 
is the central hub for the Israeli maritime 
trade, and China would gain a significant 
economic advantage by asserting itself in 
the maritime trading route in the Eastern 
Mediterranean, especially in light of its 
ambition to penetrate the European market.
The list of infrastructure projects does 
not end there. In July 201920 a plan was 
announced by the Israel Electric Corp 
(IEC) to sell its Alon Tavor power plant to 
a consortium that involves China Harbour 
Engineering, a subsidiary of Chinese 
state owned enterprise (SOE), the China 
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Communications Construction Company, 
Ltd. (CCCC). The China Railway Tunnel 
Group21 has also won a tender for the 
design and construction of tunnels and 
auxiliary electronic systems for a new 
Tel Aviv rail line worth approximately 
USD 1.4 billion. This project is deemed 
as a major infrastructural endeavor for 
Tel Aviv given the growing number of 
population in Israeli urban centers that 
will be required to rely on the use of 
city’s infrastructure. The total value22 of 
Chinese investments and construction 
projects in Israel between 2005 and 2019 
is estimated to be USD 12.19 billion. 
Apparently, the United States has objected 
to the investments into Israel made 
by powerful Chinese tech companies, 
Huawei Technologies Co. and ZTE Corp., 
viewing them as potential threats. The 
U.S. concern is rooted in the belief that 
Huawei and ZTE23 may open the path for 
Chinese surveillance in the countries in 
which they do business. For their part, the 
Chinese have dismissed these concerns 
as “ridiculous,”24 in words of Hua Chunying, 
the spokeswoman of the Chinese Foreign 
Ministry. Their presence in Israel would 
boost the competitiveness of Chinese tech 
companies in expertise and technological 
capacities if they were to pair their 
manpower and growing technological clout 
with the renowned technological expertise 
of their Israeli counterparts. Israel is 
already tempted by the prospect that its 
own tech sector might profit25 in terms of 
commercial gains and overall growth from 
the on-going Sino-American tech war. 
Indeed, in December 2019,26 
Pricewaterhouse Coopers (PWC) 
estimated that the total value of exits 
for Israeli technology startups in 2019 
jumped by 102% to USD 9.9 billion, with 
the US as the largest investor for 60% of 
the deals in the Israeli tech market. On 
the other hand, according to the Israeli 
data,27 Chinese investments in Israel’s 
high-tech sector grew from next to 
nothing to around 50 investment deals 
per year on average. Aware of its value 
in the global tech market, as well as the 
fact that both the US and China perceive 
Israel to be a highly attractive technology 
partner, Israel is tempted to stand aside 
in the US-Sino tech war in order to see 
how to navigate itself in this competition.
Troubles Ahead:  
Can Beijing Remain  
Politically Neutral? 
Nevertheless, China is faced with 
the difficult prospect of balancing its 
relationship with Iran and Israel. If Chinese 
diplomacy wants to be more active in 
the Middle East, it will have to deal with 
the ever-growing rivalry between Israel 
and Iran, as well as the rivalry that exists 
among other players across the region. 
This has already become apparent in 
January 2019,28 when China reacted to 
Israel targeting Iranian military positions in 
Syria, calling on the involved parties to find 
a political solution. This need to maintain 
a balance in Chinese relations with local 
nations brings forth major challenges 
for Chinese relations with Israel, as well 
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as for China’s policy in the region. As a report by the 
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)29 on 
Chinese foreign policy in the Middle East stated: 
“China still has a limited appetite for challenging 
the US-led security architecture in the Middle East 
or playing a significant role in regional politics.” 
However, Chinese diplomacy will be faced with 
a challenge of having to focus and engage 
diplomatically in local geopolitical rivalries. This will 
become more acute as one long-term presumption of 
China’s economic rise will be its energy dependence 
on the Middle East. This scenario would not only 
force China to become more active within the 
region, but it would also force China to reexamine 
its traditional position of political neutrality in 
regards to many regional issues including Israel. 
Another big question which remains is whether China 
will be able to be politically neutral on Palestine. 
In 2013,30 Chinese President Xi Jinping made a 
four-point proposal for the resolution of Israeli-
Palestinian conflict to the Palestinian President 
Mahmoud Abbas that involved: 1) the establishment 
of the Palestinian state; 2) negotiations as the only 
acceptable course of action, 3) application of the 
principle of “land for peace”, and 4) the international 
community providing guarantees to both parties 
during the peace process. In 2014,31 China appointed 
its diplomat Gong Xiaosheng as the Special Envoy 
on the Middle East Issue. However, neither one of 
these two diplomatic initiatives—managing Israel’s 
relations with Iran as well as Israel’s relations with 
Palestine—was pursued forcefully by Beijing. The 
balance32 that Beijing maintains between Israel and 
Palestine will be difficult to sustain as Beijing finds 
Israel an attractive country for its BRI project, but 
Beijing must also be mindful of the Palestinians 
in order to guard its name in the Arab world.
However, Chinese 
diplomacy will 
be faced with 
a challenge of 
having to focus 
and engage 
diplomatically in 
local geopolitical 
rivalries. This will 
become more 
acute as one long-
term presumption 
of China’s 
economic rise 
will be its energy 
dependence on 
the Middle East.
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The Eagle in the Room:  
The United States
That said, the biggest challenge in the 
Sino-Israeli partnership will be the United 
States. Despite the upward trend in Israel’s 
relationship with Beijing, the United States 
remains its central partner, as this alliance 
is one of the pillars of Israeli security. 
Given that the United States is becoming 
more and more engaged in a geopolitical 
rivalry with China for global supremacy, 
it will therefore not allow Israel to benefit 
from tight ties with China. This has 
already begun happening, as in January 
2019 when former US National Security 
Adviser John Bolton33 visited Israel and 
warned his host that the United States did 
not support Israel giving China advanced 
technology, did not support China building 
the Haifa Port, and opposed the presence 
of Chinese technology companies in 
the country such as Huawei and ZTE. 
Shortly thereafter, in March 2019,34 US 
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo also 
cautioned Israel that the US might reduce 
the “intelligence sharing and co-location 
of security facilities” unless Israel re-
evaluates its relationship with China.
During his visit to Israel in July 2019, John 
Rood,35 the US Undersecretary of Defense 
for Policy, also referred to the plan for the 
sale of Alon Tavor power plant. On that 
occasion, Rood noted that while the US is 
not against all forms of cooperation with 
China, he warned his hosts about China’s 
“predatory economics” seen “elsewhere 
in the world”. That same summer, the 
US defense bill, the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 
(NDAA)36 noted that the US “has an interest 
in the future forward presence of United 
States naval vessels at the Port of Haifa 
in Israel but has serious security concerns 
with respect to the leasing arrangements 
of the Port of Haifa” while urging Israel 
to “consider the security implications 
of foreign investment in Israel.”
 
Conclusion
Israel will not ignore China, as it is aware 
of its growing relevance in international 
affairs, but the imperative of maintaining 
the alliance with the United States 
will impose limits on any Israel-Sino 
partnership. Nevertheless, Israel’s growing 
partnership with China is a sign of a new 
geopolitical trend. As the Sino-American 
rivalry becomes the dominant trend of 
the international system, the key dilemma 
for many smaller states will be how to 
leverage that rivalry in order to extract 
as many concessions for themselves 
from the two competing powers. US 
allies, like Israel, will not sever their ties 
with the US as they are aware that China 
at this moment in time will not assume 
the diplomatic and security burden of 
becoming their main patron. However, 
Israel and other countries around the 
world will be involved in the strategy of 
hedging and diversifying their partnerships 
by engaging the rising China in order to 
create new options for themselves.  
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